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Abstract 
Despite the prevalence of IT outsourcing, a substantial amount of contracts have been terminated. 
Prior research has primarily assumed that clients initiate it, overlooking the possibility of vendors 
doing so. Unlike clients whose reasons may stem from poor performance or other alternatives, 
vendors would be triggered by very different reasons. They are less likely to admit their own poor 
performance or forgo contracts due to competitors. Integrating various theories, we propose 
antecedents reflecting three critical dimensions: strategic, economic and relational. Empirically 
verifying our model, we conducted a field survey, eliciting 91 responses from vendors. Results 
indicate that strategically, low reusability, negative referencing power, and low resource 
dependence will trigger vendors’ intention to terminate contracts. Economically, low penalty and 
late payment will also influence termination decision. Relationally, we observe two unexpected 
findings. Vendors are less likely to terminate an unequal contract or clients with negative social 
relationship. 
Keywords:  IT Outsourcing, Contract Termination, Vendors’ Perspective 
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Motivation  
According to the survey by Lacity and Willcocks (2000), about 34% of IT outsourcing contracts has been 
terminated. Given that the market for IT outsourcing is projected to hit $253 billion in 2010 (Caldwell & Young, 
2004), termination could result in the potential loss of billions of dollars. With the current economic downturn, 
organizations are compelled into a re-evaluation and rationalization of their IT outsourcing contracts. 
Prior research has implicitly assumed that it is always clients who initiate termination, such as the landmark break 
between JPMorgan and IBM (Cowley 2004). Consequently, the possibility of vendors doing so has been 
conveniently overlooked. Although counterintuitive, vendors do exercise their rights to terminate contracts. For 
example, in 2004, EDS chose to repay its client $135 million in order to exit from its IT outsourcing deal, after 
losing about $57 million and forecasting more loss in the future (SharedXpertise 2004). Hence, the assumption that 
vendors would hold on fervently to IT outsourcing contracts and commit unconditionally until expiration (or even 
indefinitely for evergreen IT outsourcing contracts) has been challenged. 
The exclusive emphasis on clients has helped identify some antecedents triggering contract termination, such as 
poor performance, alternative vendors, destruction to core competence, etc. (see McLaughlin and Peppard 2006; 
Whitten and Leidner 2006). However, these antecedents are neither predictive nor meaningful from vendors’ 
perspective. Vendors are less likely to admit their own poor performance or forgo their contracts due to competitors. 
Given the differences in mindsets, expectations and underlying goals between clients and vendors (Lacity and 
Hirschheim 1993), it is pertinent to unravel antecedents that will induce vendors’ intention to initiate contract 
termination. 
Additionally, we also wish to dispel the misconception that vendors are solely to blame when IT outsourcing 
culminates in termination. Without adopting a different perspective, it may appear that vendors are the only party 
which is opportunistic because the project is in their hands (see Agency Theory (Eisenhardt 1989)). Indeed, extant 
studies have provided some anecdotes and evidences of vendors who deliver low quality solutions or provide poor 
customer support (Chalos and Sung 1998), resulting in contract termination. However, the picture is not complete. 
Clients may exhibit opportunistic behavior too (Miranda and Kim 2006). They can also exploit vendors through 
unfair contracts (Lee et al. 2003) or disregard their fair share of obligations, such as “prompt payment”, and 
“dedicated project staffing” (Koh et al. 2004). Consequently, the IT outsourcing relationship is in strain and 
jeopardy. Once again, this accentuates the importance and value of investigating termination through a different 
perspective – the vendors’ perspective. 
Moreover, there is a tendency to equate “Project Success” with “Project Continuation”. Studies on IT outsourcing 
success (e.g., Koh et al. 2004; Gottchalk and Solli-Sather 2005) tend to impress upon us that a successful project 
will result in the renewal of IT outsourcing contracts. While this is likely true from clients’ perspective (Aubert et al. 
1998), it may not necessarily be so from vendors’. Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) cautioned that vendors still might 
terminate IT outsourcing contracts due to various reasons, such as a shift in strategy or to deflect resources. 
Apparently, success may not necessarily ensure its continuation, unless there is reconciliation with vendors’ 
strategies and interests. The vital but omitted role that vendors play in contract termination deserves further scrutiny. 
Hence, our research question is 
What are the antecedents predicting vendors’ intention to terminate IT outsourcing contracts? 
Literature Review 
Outsourcing Success versus Termination 
The research on IT outsourcing has evolved over time, from the initial investigations on motivation (e.g., Teng et al. 
1995) and make-or-buy decision (e.g., Ang and Straub 1998; Gilley and Abdul 2000), to the subsequent studies on 
outsourcing scope (e.g., Mclellan and Marcolin 1995) and success (e.g., Gottschalk and Solli-Sather 2005; Lee and 
Kim 1999), to the recent interests in contractual complexity (e.g., Argyres et al. 2007) and contract termination (e.g., 
Chalos and Sung 1998; Whitten and Leidner 2006). 
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Underlining all these research works is the quest for success in IT outsourcing. For clients, it not only helps them 
achieve IT operation cost savings, but also reaps the benefits from specialization, flexibility, and market competition 
(Seddon et al. 2008). For vendors, success in delivery can help establish market reputation, apart from the amount 
stipulated in the deal. Although there have been some successful stories, the potential for failure continues to besiege 
clients and vendors. Indeed, Lacity and Willcocks (1998) report that the success rate of IT outsourcing is about 56%. 
In concurrence, Boonlert (2005) highlights that IT outsourcing does not always lead to cost savings or competitive 
advantages, with the chances of success being 50:50. 
Consequently, this fuels much investigation in the antecedents governing IT outsourcing success. For example, 
Saunders et al. (1997) propose a framework to suggest the constellation of several factors (such as the perception of 
partnership with vendor, the nature of the contract, and the role of the IT function) to ensure the success of IT 
outsourcing. Other research has also explored determinants of IT outsourcing success from aspects of organizational 
capabilities and interaction processes (e.g., Han et al. 2008; Lee 2001), as well as clients’ stakeholder management 
and core competence management (e.g., Gottschalk and Solli-Sather 2005). Recent studies have also investigated 
the effect of quality and change management (Chou 2007) as well as contractual control (Argyres et al. 2007) in 
ensuring IT outsourcing success. 
From clients’ perspective, success is often equated with contract continuance (as opposed to termination). 
Researchers have underscored the nightmarish impacts and repercussions of contract termination, such as disruption 
to internal operations and huge economic loss (see Barthelemy 2003; Lacity and Willcocks 2000). Upon contract 
termination, clients can only opt for a switch in vendors or backsourcing (see McLaughlin and Peppard 2006; 
Whitten and Wakefield 2006). Both these options are, however, plagued with difficulty. Unless compelled, clients 
would not want to land themselves in this dire predicament. 
Amongst the few who have investigated contract termination, they fundamentally focus on clients’ perspective. Low 
service quality has been typically singled out as a catalyst toward contract termination (Zeithaml et al. 1988). It 
tempts clients to consider switching to vendors who possess the ability to offer a better service, if not a lower price 
(Wagner and Friedl 2007). Concurring, Whitten and Leidner (2006) incorporate prior studies and empirically 
establish that low product quality or service quality, as well as low relationship quality and switching cost can 
trigger clients to terminate ongoing IT outsourcing projects. In addition, Veltri et al. (2006) caution that contract 
problems, internal organizational changes and external environmental changes also could induce clients to terminate 
contracts.  
Unfortunately, the discourse on contract termination from clients’ perspective may not always apply to vendors’ 
perspective. Recent studies (e.g., Koh et al. 2004) have separated psychological obligations of vendors from those of 
clients and argue that clients sometimes fail to fulfill their fair share of obligations too. For example, by not 
dedicating project staff or not sharing knowledge, clients can jeopardize the IT outsourcing relationship. Also, 
vendors cherish prompt payment (Kern and Willcocks 2002) and reusability of their resources (Hamel 1996). In 
essence, vendors are more committed to relationships which they depend on for resources, business knowledge and 
market reputation (Swinarski et al. 2003). Inspired by theoretical assertions and empirical studies from vendors’ 
perspective, it is rational to assume that vendors may terminate contracts for various reasons that are distinct from 
clients. 
Strategic, Economic and Relational Dimensions 
Several theories have been employed to better understand IT outsourcing, such as Resource Based Theory (e.g., 
Levina and Ross 2003), Resource Dependency Theory (e.g., Grover et al. 1996), Power Political Theory (e.g., Allen 
et al. 2002), Transaction Cost Economics (e.g., Ang and Straub 1998), Agency Theory (e.g., Bahli and Rivard 
2003), Social Exchange Theory (e.g., Lee and Kim 1999) and Equity Theory (e.g., Outlay 2007). Synthesizing these 
theoretical lenses, we emerge with three dimensions (strategic, economic and relational) that may help explain 
vendors’ contract termination decisions. 
The strategic dimension is concerned with how organizations formulate and implement strategies to accomplish a 
desired performance goal (Schendel and Hofer 1979). For example, Roy and Aubert (2002) draw from Resource 
Based Theory to present a theoretical framework for domestic sourcing, including four strategies: outsourcing, 
internal governance, partnership and recuperation. Resource Based Theory posits that competitive advantage is 
rooted in resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (Barney 1991). In other words, 
organizations would keep strategic IT functions in-house and outsource those which cannot grant them competitive 
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advantage (Alvarez-Suescun 2007). Otherwise, upon IT outsourcing, clients are dependent on vendors for their 
deliverables (Teng et al. 1995). Resource Dependence Theory purports that all organizations are dependent, to 
varying degrees, on some elements in their environments (Aldrich 1976). This dependence stems from controls over 
needed resources, discretion over usage of needed resources, and dearth of alternative sources (Kotter 1990; Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). Similarly, as espoused by Power-Political Theory, power is derived from offering valuable 
resources that few other sources can provide (Emerson 1962). The dependence of organizations on another is a 
function of the goals mediated by the latter, the motivational investment of the former, the availability of 
alternatives, and the negative impact upon discontinuance of the relationship (El-Ansary 1975). In a nutshell, there is 
dependence on another if survivability can be threatened. 
The economic dimension is most often used to elucidate the widespread phenomena of IT outsourcing (e.g., Ang 
and Straub 1998; Chalos and Sung 1998). When clients seek cheaper development channels in countries like India 
and China, the tenets underlying Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson 1985) and Agency Theory (Eisenhardt 
1989) are most appropriately applied. Transaction cost typically refers to the constellation of searching cost, 
negotiation cost, policing and enforcement cost. Through the weighing of these costs against the potential benefits, 
clients can better decide on “make or buy” as well as “single or multiple” vendors (e.g., Aubert et al. 1996; 
Nywenyama and Bryson 1999). In essence, clients should outsource when internal production presents comparative 
cost disadvantages, but should exit when transaction cost exceeds production saving (Falaleeva and Saunders 2006). 
Adding to the calculus of exit, however, is yet another transaction cost – the switching cost, which should be taken 
into consideration when clients decide to discontinue the current relationship (Barthelemy 2001). 
Even though the economics may not be promising at times, Dibbern et al. (2004) purport that a close relationship 
may help organizations tide over financial difficulties. This underscores the importance of the relational dimension, 
as expounded by numerous theories, such as Social Exchange Theory (Homans 1958) and Equity Theory (Adams 
1963, 1965). Relationship is cultivated by a shared business understanding, trust, quality communication, joint 
action, and commitment between clients and vendors (Lee and Kim 1999). By promoting cooperation and helping to 
resolve conflicts, a good relationship is critical for a long term contract continuance (Grover et al. 1996). Arguably, 
organizations are unlikely to ignore equity concerns. Based on Equity Theory, there are three kinds, namely 
reciprocal equity, procedural equity and distributive equity (Joshi 1989). Reciprocal equity refers to the 
impartialness in responding generously to cooperative acts and punishing uncooperative ones (Falk and Fischbacher 
2006). According to Molm et al. (2003), those who consistently reciprocate others’ giving are perceived as fair. 
Procedural equity refers to the introduction of processes that facilitate the smooth running of IT outsourced activities 
and in times of disputes and disagreements, make available a channel for redress and an opportunity to be heard 
(Molm et al. 1993). Previous studies have found that organizations which demonstrate procedural fairness engender 
greater trust and expectation of continuity (Anderson and Weitz 1992). Distributive equity is more concerned with 
the fairness in allocation during the exchange (Leventhal 1976). In IT outsourcing, the fairness in allocation is a sign 
that both parties are serious about achieving success. In sum, inequity in contracts can trigger organizations to 
reestablish the equity, through renegotiating (Kabanoff 1991) or resistance and retaliation (Lawler 1975). 
As IT outsourcing continues to burgeon, not only are clients capable of contract termination, but also vendors. We, 
hence, see value in applying multiple theoretical lenses to identify antecedents predicting vendors’ contract 
termination. We hope the integration of Strategic-Economic-Relational dimensions will be elucidative. 
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Research Model and Hypotheses  
 
Figure 1.  Research Model 
Strategic 
Reusability  
From vendors’ perspective, the reusability of IT artifacts refers to their ability to adopt existing ones for subsequent 
usage instead of building them from scratch again. The types of IT artifacts that can be reused are not only limited to 
software source codes, but also the design structures, specifications and documentations (Prieto-Diaz 1993). It is 
only strategically wise if vendors could replicate their solutions easily from one project to another, thereby saving 
substantial amount of effort and resources (Ang and Straub 1998; Loh and Venkatraman 1992a; Slaughter and Ang 
1996). On the other hand, if the deliverables and assets of a project are too specialized and customized, the 
reusability is drastically reduced (White and Levine 1961). Reusability, therefore, makes it justifiable to venture into 
the respective projects that usually entail expensive personnel training, methodological development and even 
customer relationship management (Levina and Ross 2003). All these point to a negative relationship between 
reusability and vendors’ decision to terminate contracts. 
In addition, reusability serves as a means to compensate loss, if any at all (Gilbert and Ricadela 2001). In other 
words, when vendors can easily tap on existing expertise for subsequent IT outsourcing bids or when software 
developers can quickly find large fragments of reusable and high quality source codes, they are less likely to 
consider terminating the project even if potential loss looms large (say, due to fixed price contract). With the 
consolation that reusability is high, vendors would choose contract continuance. In sum, vendors would strategically 
opt to terminate projects with low reusability and pursue those with high reusability. Hence, we hypothesize 
H1: Reusability is negatively associated with vendors’ terminating intention  
Human Behavior and Information Technology 
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Referencing Power 
Referencing power reflects the ability of clients to positively promote or negatively tarnish vendors’ reputation. Its 
importance can be underscored when most Request for Proposal make it integral to highlight referrals. In order to 
survive and proliferate in the IT outsourcing industry, vendors often strategize over which clients to partner with and 
which projects to embark on, so as to catapult them to greater heights. Expectedly, vendors would seek reputable 
clients or high profile projects when possible. When clients possess positive referencing power, vendors are less 
inclined to initiate contract termination (regardless of their experience) because of the promise of a raise in market 
reputation and hopefully, market share. Even if it spells some sacrifices and loss (Natovich 2003), vendors would be 
reluctant to break up the relationship.  
Conversely, vendors would not hesitate to exit from a relationship with clients who frequently complain about their 
services in the market. Presumably, when clients have negative experience with vendors, they would tend to 
exaggerate their dissatisfaction, which can severely damage and deprecate vendors’ reputation (Reichheld and Teal 
1996). Assessing difficulty in pleasing these unsatisfied clients (Dowling and Mark 1997), it would be strategically 
wise for vendors to let go and guide clients to alternative vendors (Reichheld 2006). In essence, positive referencing 
power confers clients with strategic importance. Hence, we posit 
H2: Referencing power is negatively associated with vendors’ terminating intention 
Resource Dependence  
According to Resource Dependence Theory, the demand for resources, regardless of physical or informational 
resources, from the environment, renders organizations potentially dependent on external sources (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). An emergent market practice is to pay more attention to relationships that offer more resources 
(Raaija and Van 2003). In IT outsourcing, vendors might be highly dependent on clients for physical resources as 
well as informational resources. The former includes infrastructure, plants, equipments, etc. whereas the latter 
includes business processes, values, etc. High resource dependence would suggest that vendors are inclined to stay 
contracted in order to secure a convenient and lasting usage of these resources. 
Noteworthy, the notion of information resources has become increasingly salient (King and Grover 1991), as they 
add to organizational knowledge and position vendors in a more strategic advantage than their competitors (Johnston 
and Carrico 1988). Arguably, the value of information resources (Koh et al. 2004) would cause vendors to better 
appreciate their current relationship with clients. In short, vendors’ high dependence on physical and information 
resources can help preserve relationship with clients. So, we conjecture 
H3: Resource dependence is negatively associated with vendors’ termination intention  
Economic  
Project Revenue and Penalty 
Project revenue can be regarded as a proxy of profit (Raaija and Van 2003). It would be lost in terms of opportunity 
cost if IT outsourcing is terminated. Opportunity cost is defined as the value of the next best alternative foregone as 
the result of making a decision. It is important in understanding organizational decision-making (McConnell 2005). 
When project revenue is high, vendors would be enticed to sustain the relationship. Otherwise, they would be 
forsaking a lucrative amount of money. However, when project revenue is low, vendors might be less apprehensive 
about abandoning it. 
Not only would vendors lose out on the project revenue, but also they would incur a penalty for initiating contract 
termination. As a mutual agreement, IT outsourcing contracts usually stipulate penalty clauses explicitly to 
safeguard either party (Bo 1989). Presumably, a contract with huge penalty makes vendors hesitant to relinquish the 
project (Turnbull et al. 1996). Conversely, when the penalty is negligible, vendors might not have second thoughts 
about ending it. In sum, high project revenue and high penalty signal a huge amount forsaken upon termination. 
Hence, we predict a negative relation for both. 
H4: Project revenue is negatively associated with vendors’ termination intention  
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H5: Penalty is negatively associated with vendors’ termination intention 
Late Payment  
Typically in IT outsourcing, clients prefer to break the project into different phases (for management and monitoring 
purposes) and settle payment at the end of each phase. Prompt payment refers to the timely processing of payment 
by clients. They should not be withholding payment unreasonably (Jane 2002). Accentuating its importance, Koh et 
al. (2004) endorse prompt payment as one of the six prominent obligations that vendors expect clients to fulfill. 
Indeed, vendors are highly concerned over late payment (Kern and Willcocks 2002), and perturbed by clients who 
deliberately do so, giving excuses of all sorts. At times, clients are not contented with vendors’ services and refuse 
to sign-off the project deliverables, in an attempt to hold vendors hostage and bargain for more. At other times, late 
payment might be unintentional. The project sign-off misses the budget cycle and clients would have to delay 
payment. 
When late payment is frequent, vendors can run into serious financial and operational crises due to their heavy initial 
investments and the belated financial support (Bin et al. 2008). This will immensely jeopardize vendors’ business 
and trigger their intention to terminate contracts. Conversely, when late payment hardly occurs, vendors are blessed 
with a continuous supply of funding and capital turnover to run their business (Kern and Willcocks 2002), resulting 
in stable performance and service quality. Consequently, vendors would be more eager to sustain the relationship. 
Thus, we postulate that 
H6: Late payment is positively associated with vendors’ termination intention 
Relational  
Social Relationship  
Conflicts are inevitable in any relationship. However, excessive conflicts could culminate in the termination of 
relationship. Fortunately, there are ways to help mitigate, if not eliminate, conflicts. In IT outsourcing, conflicts 
could be reduced as social exchanges become institutionalized over time by both clients and vendors (Kern et al. 
1999). Social ties provide a network through which coalitions can be built (Rogers-Gillmore 1987). When the tie is 
strong, vendors would perceive the relationship as more durable in the face of conflicts, thereby being more resistant 
to contract termination. Conversely, when the tie is weak, conflicts might actually aggravate the situation, resulting 
in distrust and tension (Labiance et al. 1998), and an eagerness to break the contract.  
Amazingly, at times, the strength of social ties can even transcend and replace the focus on economics (Robinson 
1996). Some research (e.g., Kern and Willcocks 2002) has actually attributed contract continuance (despite concerns 
over the economics) to the strong bonding between clients and vendors. Apparently, positive social relationship may 
alleviate some of vendors’ concerns and worries, preventing them from pulling the plug. Moreover, positive social 
relationship takes a long time and much effort to nurture. When vendors have committed so much in cultivating the 
social relationship, such as daily interactions with clients’ personnel and weekly meetings or monthly meetings with 
the steering committee (Cata and Raghavan 2003), their cumulatively vested interests would discourage them from 
terminating the relationship (Turnbull et al. 1996). Thus, 
H7: Social relationship is negatively associated with vendors’ termination intention  
Contractual Relationship Inequity  
Contracts provide a legally bound agreement between clients and vendors, detailing in black and white the rights, 
duties, and responsibilities of contracting parties, as well as specifying the goals, policies and strategies underlying 
the arrangement (Gottschalk and Solli-Sather 2005). In spite of the effort, contracts can never be perfect. Hence, it 
could be biased in favor of those who craft it (e.g., clients). In IT outsourcing, when clients create a win-lose 
situation at the expense of vendors, the latter might be tempted to terminate the relationship (Lee et al. 2003). After 
all, the feeling of being exploited by clients has strained the relationship with vendors. When contractual 
relationships are unequal, vendors do not feel obligated to reciprocate in cooperative acts. Without an appropriate 
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channel for recourse, vendors would deem it very hard to restore inequity. Eventually, they will opt for withdrawal 
from a relationship that is enshrouded with unfairness. Hence, 
H8: Contractual relationship inequity is positively associated with vendors’ terminating intention 
Research Methodology  
Survey Instrument and Operationalization of Constructs 
We followed the steps proposed by Churchill (1979) to develop measures for our constructs. Extensive review was 
first conducted to delineate and specify the domain. With a clear conceptualization, we generated items to accurately 
reflect the dimensions of constructs. Wherever possible, we adopted past measures; otherwise, we modified or 
developed them based on literature review. Subsequently, we validated the items through sorting. Each item was 
printed on a card and shuffled into random orders. Four judges were employed to sort the cards according to given 
categories. A “Too Ambiguous/Not Applicable” category was included to ensure that the judges were not forced to 
fit any item into a particular category. Sorting results were generally good, with Cohen’s Kappa scores averaging 
0.74 (Cohen 1960) and the overall placement ratio of items within about 86.9% (Moore and Benbasat 1991) (see 
Table 1). 
We controlled for 6 variables which might potentially influence the results. Vendor size (SIZ) was controlled 
because a bigger vendor might be able to better buffer losses from contract termination. Client size (CLI) might also 
be indicative of vendors’ ability to effortlessly terminate contracts. Project type (TYP) (i.e., system development 
versus non system development) had to be controlled because the former typically involves higher complexity and 
uncertainty, resulting in a higher chance of failure and termination. We controlled for two time frames: project 
length and project age. Project length (LEN) was controlled because it would be easier for vendors to await a short-
term contract to expire without terminating it, so as not to incur any penalty. Project age (AGE) was also controlled 
because one that had just taken off would have less opportunity to accumulate conflicts or see results; thereby 
reducing vendors’ intention to terminate contracts. Last, the number of people involved (PEO) was indicative of its 
complexity and the amount of conflicts that might surface. 
Data Collection  
We drew our sample from the members in Singapore IT Federation (SITF), targeting project managers and 
executives who are cognizant about IT outsourcing projects, and have the power to influence or make decisions 
regarding terminating contracts. Searching the contacts from various sources, we sent out personalized letters to 334 
organizations. Two weeks after the initial mailing, followed up telephone calls were conducted. When needed, a 
second copy of the questionnaire was mailed or faxed. To entice their participation, respondents were given a token 
souvenir commemorating the 2008 Olympics. In total, we received 91 replies out of the 334, giving a response rate 
of 27%. On average, the respondents are 34.5 years old (s.d.=7.2), with 72% of them being male.  
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Table 1. Operationalization of Constructs 
CODE ITEMS NOTE 
Intention to Terminate A Contract (TER) 
TER Vendor’s likelihood of terminating a contract  Field interviews 
Reusability (REU)  
REU1 Likelihood of reusing the codes for future projects  
REU2 Likelihood of reusing the methodology for future projects 





Referencing Power (REF)  
REF1 Client’s likelihood to refer your solution to other prospects  
REF2 Client’s likelihood to refer your service to other prospects 





Resource Dependence (DEP) 
DEP1 Importance of client’s knowledge sharing for future success 
DEP2 Importance of client’s informational resource for future success 
DEP3 Importance of client’s physical resource for future success 
Develop from 
Resource 
Dependence Theory  
(Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978) 
Project Revenue (REV) 
REV Project Revenue (in S$)  
Penalty  (PEN) 
PEN Severity of Penalty  
Late Payment  (PAY) 
PAY Extent of delayed payment (in terms of number of days)  
Social Relationship (SOC) 
SOC1 Social communication quality with the client 
SOC2 Social understanding level with the client 
SOC3 Social activity involvement with the client 
Develop from Social  
Bonds Concept  
(Kern and Willcocks 
2002) 
Contractual Relationship Inequity (CON) 
CON1 Reciprocal inequity (e.g., the benefits your organization receives are less 
than what it deserves) 
CON2 Procedural inequity (e.g., your organization experiences unfair 
procedures to arrive at the agreement) 
CON3 Distributive inequity (e.g., clients are given undeserved preferential 
treatment)  
Adopt from Equity 
Perception 
Joshi (1989) 
Note: All scales are measured on a 7 point Likert scale unless otherwise started. 
          R denotes reverse scales. 
Human Behavior and Information Technology 
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Data Analysis and Results 
Instrument Validation  
We validated our instrument on three aspects: individual item reliability, internal consistency, and discriminant 
validity (Barclay et al. 1995). Results for factor loading were all above 0.7 (see Table 2), except for CON1 (i.e., 
0.68). The reliability was satisfied (Barclay et al.1995; Chin 1998). To assess discriminant validity, the loadings and 
cross-loading of items were examined. Loading of items on their respective latent variables should be higher than 
loadings of other items on these latent variables and the loading of these items on other latent variables. This 
requirement was met. Another criterion for discriminant validity requires that the square root of Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) of any latent variable should be greater than the correlations shared between the latent variable and 
other latent variables (i.e., the diagonal elements should be greater than the corresponding off-diagonal ones). Again, 
this requirement was met (see Table 3). Finally, the third step to assess the instrument validity involves examining 
its measurement reliability. The Cronbach’s Alpha ranged from 0.75 to 0.91, indicating high internal consistency.  
 
Table 2. Factor Loading Result 
Rotated Component Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 
SOC1 (CA=0.90) 0.89 -0.03 -0.19 -0.06 -0.01 
SOC2 0.85 -0.20 -0.12 -0.15 0.02 
SOC3 0.88 -0.11 -0.22 -0.01 0.08 
DEP1 (CA=0.91) -0.11 0.90 0.12 0.19 0.02 
DEP2 -0.18 0.86 0.21 0.20 0.12 
DEP3 -0.05 0.85 0.07 0.19 0.15 
REU1 (CA=0.87) -0.28 0.17 0.82 0.04 0.12 
REU2 -0.19 0.06 0.82 0.24 0.18 
REU3 -0.15 0.19 0.79 0.25 0.25 
REF1 (CA=0.77) -0.02 0.18 0.14 0.73 0.23 
REF2 0.00 0.14 0.28 0.86 -0.01 
REF3 -0.19 0.28 0.04 0.73 -0.07 
CON1 (CA=0.75) 0.23 0.18 0.24 -0.12 0.68 
CON2 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.88 
CON3 -0.19 0.01 0.12 0.35 0.75 
Eigenvalue 3.282 2.34 1.834 1.35 0.95 
Variance (%) 35.22 15.60 12.23 8.97 6.32 
Cum. Variance (%) 35.22 50.82 63.04 72.02 78.33 
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Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, Scale Reliabilities, and Intercorrelations 
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.TER 3.47 1.76 -    
2.REU 4.39 1.55 **-0.63 (0.89)   
3.REF 4.53 1.09 **-0.57 **0.41 (0.83)   
4.DEP 4.29 1.46 **-0.60 **0.37 **0.45 (0.92)   
5.REV 5437 1119 -0.08 0.14 0.23 0.12 -   
6.PEN 4.54 1.57 **-0.64 **0.44 **0.43 **0.62 0.01 -   
7.PAY 19.15 6.62 0.19 -0.16 -0.10 -0.05 0.13 -0.02 -   
8.SOC 4.14 1.35 **0.49 **-0.42 *-0.25 **-0.27 -0.05 *-0.25 -0.02 (0.91)  
9.CON 4.31 1.13 **-0.38 **0.37 0.21 *0.23 0.01 **0.35 0.18 0.03 (0.81)  
10.SIZ 2.94 1.61 0.13 -0.15 0.04 -0.13 0.06 *-0.24 -0.11 *0.25 -0.12 -   
11.CLI 4.59 1.57 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.09 -0.12 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.16 **0.26 -  
12.TYP 0.54 0.50 0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.03 0.16 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.16 -0.13 *-0.22 -  
13.LEN 39.12 11.53 0.03 0.11 -0.06 -0.08 0.20 -0.07 0.03 -0.18 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.09 -  
14.AGE 18.23 9.42 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 **0.21 -0.01 0.08 -0.08 -0.01 -0.20 **0.42 - 
15.PEO 33.47 13.23 0.16 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 **0.44 -0.10 0.04 *0.25 -0.05 **0.34 0.13 -0.06 0.10 -0.03
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
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Table 4 summarizes the regression results. The overall model explained 70.1% of the variance on vendor’s intention 
to terminate a contract (F=12.56, p<0.01). Adding to the six controls in Model 1 (F=0.756, p>0.05), the eight 
antecedents help give rise to a significant relationship in Model 2 (∆R2 = 0.649). In terms of direct effects, vendors’ 
intention to terminate contracts showed a significant relationship with Reusability (β=-0.198, p<0.05), Referencing 
Power (β=-0.177, p<0.05), Resource Dependence (β=-0.164, p<0.05), Penalty (β=-0.211, p<0.05) and Late Payment 
(β=0.154, p<0.05). Contrary to prediction, Project Revenue (β=-0.017, p>0.05) did not exhibit a significant 
relationship with vendors’ intention to terminate contracts. 
We observed two surprising findings. Vendors’ intention to terminate contracts was positively related to Social 
Relationship (β=0.300, p<0.01) and negatively associated with Contractual Relationship Inequity (β=-0.205, 
p<0.01). This implied that positive social relationship between vendors and clients actually enables vendors to effect 
contract termination more comfortably. Likewise, unequal contracts actually discourage vendors from contract 
termination. Both results are intriguing and warrant further discussion in the next section. 
Regression Result 
Table 4. Regression Result 
Model 1 Model 2 
Independent Variables 
β t β t 
Strategic     
    Reusability   -0.198 *2.234 
    Referencing Power   -0.177 *2.260 
    Resource Dependence   -0.164 *1.912 
     
Economic      
    Project Revenue   -0.017 0.232 
    Penalty   -0.211 *2.362 
    Late Payment   0.154 *2.251 
     
Relational     
    Social Relationship   0.300 **3.727 
    Contractual Relationship Inequity   -0.205 **2.660 
 
Controls     
    Vendor Size 0.115 0.995 0.075 1.021 
    Client Size -0.012 -0.109 0.054 0.762 
    Project Type 0.136 1.118 0.004 0.061 
    Project Length -0.045 0.371 0.070 0.922 
    Project Age 0.094 0.771 0.025 0.340 
    Number of People Involved 0.139 1.243 0.046 0.618 
 
R square 0.052 0.701 
Change in R square - 0.649 
Adjusted R square 0.017 0.645 
F 0.756 **12.56 
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Dependent Variable: Intention to Terminate the Contract 
Discussion 
Strategic factors play a vital role in influencing vendors’ intention to terminate IT outsourcing contracts. When 
vendors consider issues of high reusability, positive referencing power, and high resource dependence, they are 
deterred from abandoning the relationship. High reusability ensures that the effort and time expended currently will 
position vendors at a strategic vantage point subsequently. Likewise, capitalizing on clients’ positive referencing 
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power can enhance vendors’ reputation, which is acknowledged as a source of sustainable competitive advantage for 
organizations (Hall 1992). Finally, without the ability to obtain from elsewhere, high resource dependence dictates 
that vendors cherish and stay in the relationship. 
Likewise, economic factors (such as high penalty and late payment) are quite predictive of vendors’ intention to 
terminate contracts. Expectedly, no organizations would want to suffer a penalty, unless inevitable. In IT 
outsourcing, the amount for penalty is usually substantial (e.g., EDS paid $135 million). Hence, vendors would be 
inclined to persist in delivery. Affecting the financial status and manipulations of vendors, prompt payment by 
clients are essential. Without which, vendors might be entrapped with financial problems and operational obstacles, 
resulting in their quest to terminate contracts. At times, late payment might even signal to vendors that clients are 
suffering from financial instability, thereby tempting vendors to break the deal before more loss are incurred should 
clients eventually declare bankruptcy. 
Surprisingly, project revenue, is not significantly related to clients’ intention to terminate contracts. Two plausible 
explanations are offered. First, regardless of high or low project revenue, it is still a desirable gain which vendors 
would not want to lose by terminating contracts. If they terminate contracts when economic returns seem low, they 
would even lose the token sum. According to Framing Theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1981), vendors tend to be 
more risk averse rather than risk seeking in the realms of gains. Thus, they are unlikely to sacrifice the anticipated 
revenue, however small, in exchange for unpredictability in new alternative projects. Second, the same amount of 
revenue could be accorded different weights by different vendors. For example, a one-million-dollar contract may 
mean much more to some vendors than others, depending on a variety of factors. For example, if the amount 
constitutes a large proportion of vendors’ total sales, it might serve as a deterrent to contract termination. 
Relational factors also offer some surprises. A positive social relationship actually enables vendors to initiate their 
termination of contracts more readily, as opposed to conventional wisdom – which suggest that positive social 
relationship prevents vendors from doing so. On deeper thoughts, the possibility exists. An interview with some 
vendors helps shed light. Often than not, vendors are worried about retaliation and repercussion. For example, with a 
nasty social relationship, contract termination can easily land vendors in court, because clients are antagonized and 
refuse to settle out of court. However, with a tender social relationship, clients might exhibit more empathy toward 
vendors’ difficulties and dilemma, thereby accepting vendors’ quest for termination more amicably. After all, a good 
social relationship may bring forth subsequent collaboration despite the current termination. 
Unexpectedly, contract inequity is negatively associated with vendors’ termination intention. In other words, 
unequal contracts rather than equal ones help glue vendors to the deal. It could be attributed to setting the right 
expectations. Upon signing up an unequal contract, vendors should be well prepared for unfair treatments. To 
receive less than promised or deliver more than agreed upon would be anticipated. Hence, these might not prompt 
vendors into contract termination. In essence, with lowered expectations by vendors, it is not hard for clients to 
measure up. Conversely, an equal contract may scale up vendors’ expectation. Being optimistic, vendors might be 
more deluded when issues and problems start setting in. Oza and Hall (2005) echo in agreement: high expectations 
from vendors upon signing up the contract shorten the durable of relationship, whereas low expectations extend it. 
Theoretical and Practical Contributions  
We contribute by advancing IT outsourcing research in these few ways. First, our study highlights an important gap 
in extant work and seeks to fill it – more precisely, past research has implicitly assumed that only clients will 
terminate contracts, but has conveniently overlooked the likelihood of vendors doing so. By making salient this 
possibility, we accentuate the fact that IT outsourcing is at least a dyadic, if not polyadic, relationship. This unravels 
a plethora of important issues that might warrant further investigation from the vendors’ perspective, if not a dyadic 
treatment. For example, contract terminations by clients are often attributed to vendors’ opportunism, a phenomenon 
underlying the tenets of Agency Theory (Eisenhardt 1989). Seldom discussed, but just as relevant and real, is 
clients’ opportunistic behavior. A re-examination of assumptions in extant work would be insightful. 
Second, we provide a more holistic view to understanding vendors’ intention to terminate contracts, beyond the 
obvious notion of economic reasons. We profess the integration of relational and strategic theories to economic 
theories, so as to better capture both the soft aspect (relational and strategic) and the hard aspect (economic) of IT 
outsourcing. Resultantly, a preliminary framework that adopts the Strategic-Economic-Relational view is conceived, 
to be leveraged on by future researchers. By doing so, we manage to not only examine unilateral variables (such as 
revenue and penalty), but also allows investigation of bilateral variables (such as social relationship). Once again, 
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this brings salient the dyadic or polyadic relationship underlying IT outsourcing. In essence, we add to the works of 
elites who study contract termination only through an economic lens (e.g. Ngwenyama and Bryson 1999). 
Third, we delineate the subtle but important difference between outsourcing success and contract continuance. 
Outsourcing success alone, at least from vendors’ perspective, might not ensure contract continuance. Without 
acknowledging this often confounded concept, clients might be unduly thrown into bewilderment and the urgent 
need to find alternative vendors or backsource when vendors suddenly choose termination over continuance, despite 
a successful delivery. Comparing findings from our study with those that explore clients’ contract termination, we 
discover that the determinants for contract termination differ remarkably. In a nutshell, for clients, it predominantly 
revolves around low service quality (Chalos and Sung 1998), loss of core competence (Whitten and Leidner 2006), 
or an underestimation of cost involved (Falaleeva and Saunders 2006). But for vendors, our study unravels strategic 
reasons like low reusability or negative referencing power, economic reasons like late payment (rather than low 
project revenue), and relational reasons. 
Fourth, we offer a paradoxical view on relational dimensions (such as social relationship and contractual 
relationship inequity). On one hand, most articles (e.g., Davis 2004; Lee and Kim 1999) have espoused the 
importance of a positive social relationship and a fair contract. They may help in governing the success (if not 
necessarily the continuance) of IT outsourcing. Hence, clients and vendors alike are both working hard to strengthen 
their bonds (McLaughlin and Peppard 2006). Prior to signing the contract, they will also engage legal consultants to 
pore over the contracts and scrutinize every seemingly equivocal clause. On the other hand, our study purports that 
these same factors (i.e., positive social relationship and equal contracts) help pave the way for early contract 
termination, at least by vendors! Our research, hence, illustrates the irony and complexity plaguing real life issues. 
In addition to theoretical contributions, our study has important implications for major stakeholders (such as clients, 
vendors and even legal professionals). Vendors could use our findings to refrain themselves from culminating in 
early contract termination. As postulated by Contingency Theory (Ginzberg and Venkatraman 1985), no project is 
optimal for all organizations and the appropriateness of a project depends on the competitive setting the 
organizations are in. Good IT outsourcing projects are the ones that would render vendors strategic advantage in 
their environmental and organizational conditions. Clients could also count on our findings to effectively devise 
mechanisms to reduce, if not entirely curb, vendors’ termination intention. While clients have been vigilantly 
safeguarding vendors’ opportunism, they might have overlooked the needs of vendors (Kern and Willcocks 2002), 
which could result in the case of project success but contract termination. Given that some vendors might be more 
established than clients and not at the mercy of clients (Bin et al. 2008), understanding vendors has become 
increasingly important. This study has helped expose some concerns bothering vendors. Legal professionals and 
consultants would want to be cognizant about our findings and advise clients and vendors accordingly too. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
As the study was conducted in Singapore, some might be concerned with the generalizability of our findings. 
However, given that increasingly, more clients are opting for IT outsourcing to Asia (such as India and China), our 
findings might reflect the aura of global IT outsourcing, from the perspective of vendors.  
Our study did not examine the multiple projects scenario, whereby a vendor signs up multiple projects with a single 
client (Gallivan and Oh 1999). Increasingly, there is an emergent trend of clients hiring the same vendor for multiple 
projects (Patton 2005). We speculate that in this situation, the decision for vendors to terminate one project may be 
influenced by the precarious fate of other projects with the same client. However, it could also be the case that other 
projects help make up for what is non-delivered in this to be terminated project. Given the varied possibilities, it 
calls for an interesting future research. 
Another fruitful venue for research is the multi-vendor relationship. Having examined a single vendor relationship, 
we recognize the presence of multi-vendor arrangements. Indeed, a recent survey reveals that 42% of clients use 
three or more outsourcing vendors, while 36% use fewer than three and only 22% are sticking with one (Patton 
2005). Again, it invites us to wonder whether other vendors would be influential in swaying the decisions of a 
vendor. 
To conclude, we hope that more research on IT outsourcing which embraces views from both clients and vendors 
would be embarked, so as to enhance the success rate of IT outsourcing and if possible, contract continuation. 
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